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BELARUS: CIVILIAN CONTROL OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRUCTURES 
 
Vyachaslav Paznyak  
 
 
1 Defense and National Security Structures in Belarus:  
the Institutional Setting 
 
Belarus' security structures are represented by Chart 1 (see next page). They 
include the bodies of the top state management, the so-called "power bloc" – the 
Defense Ministry, the Ministry of the Interior, the State Security Committee, the 
Ministry for Emergency Situations, State Border Troops Committee, State Customs 
Committee, the Procurator's Office, as well as several interdepartmental agencies 
like the Commission on Export Controls and the Commission on Economic Security. 
There are also several semi-autonomius bodies, dealing with security issues, like the 
Institute for Social and Political Research and the Center for Law-Making under the 
Administration of the President, the National Security Institute and some others.  
 
1.1 National Security and Defense Structures: an overview 
 
The armed forces of the Republic of Belarus were created following the decision by 
the govermment of March 20, 1992. During the Soviet times Belarus hosted about 1 
500 military formations of the Belarusian Military District, which totaled over 240 000 
troops. After the dissolution of the USSR Belarus became the most militarized 
republic of the erstwhile entity. The new independent state could not afford to keep 
such excessive numbers. Besides, the relevant international agreements stipulated 
much lower force levels. According to the 1992 Helsinki agreement their maximal 
figure for Belarus could not exceed 100 000. Already by the end of the 90's force 
reductions undertaken by the Belarusian government have brought down the original 
numbers to about 83 000 servicemen. 
 
Table 1. BELARUS' ARMED FORCES1 
                                                 
1 The Military Balance 2001-2002. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. – London: 
Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 83. 
  
Active 82 900 
Reserves 289 500 
Army 43 600 
Air Force 12 000 
Air Defense Force 10 200 
 
 
2 Reductions of Belarus' Armed Forces2 
 
 2000 2005 
Total 100 000 65 000 
Servicemen Over 80 000 50 000 
 
The reformation of the armed forces is carried out in accordance with the "Concept of 
Building the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus until 2010" and "The Program 
of the Completion of the Reform of the Armed Forces for the period from 2001 
through 2005." The reform differentiated the authorities of the ministry of defense and 
General Staff. The ministry of defense as the organ of state control is entrusted with 
with the implementation of state policy on questions of defense. It is responsible for 
their building and development, and also preparation for the accomplishment of the 
objectives of the armed protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity of state. The 
General Staff, in its turn, executes operational control of the armed forces, the 
organization of interaction and coordination of the activity of the armed forces with 
other military formations.  
 
The changes accomplished include combining the Air and Air defense Forces, 
downsizing the force structure about 30% from 83,000 to 60,000, transitioning from a 
conscript to a contract force (which today constitutes 20 per cent of servicemen), and 
modernizing the command and control structure by creating a Ground Forces 
Command between the Ministry of Defense and the units in the field (territirial 
defense forces).  
                                                 
2 Gurulev, Serguei. Aktual'nyje Voprosy Reformirovanija Vooruzhennykh Sil Respubliki 
Belarus (Topical Issues of Reforming Belarus' Armed Forces). Available online: 
http://www.mod.mil.by/statya.html 
Chart 1.  TENTATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF BELARUS' SECURITY STRUCTURES 
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The current structure of Belarus' Armed Forces includes Grounf Forces, the 
combined Air Force and Air Defense, Rocket and Artillery Forces, Engeneer Forces, 
Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defense Forces, Communication Forces, Radio 
and Electronic Counterforce units, military schools and MOD enterprises. 
 
Additionally, there have been introduced such novelties as service "in reserve" and 
territorial forces. Service "in reserve" will be legally formalized by the adoption of the 
respective law. It implies that highly qualified professionals will not serve full-time, but 
will be called upon to undergo short-term training sessions. Their total term of service 
will be from 2 to 3 years. The territorial forces will be deployed during the pre-war and 
war-time. Alternative service is also planned. 
 
Figure 1. Сorrelation of the number of armed forces with the population in some 
European states3 
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b) Table 3. Ministry of the Interior Forces4 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
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Total number: about 80 000, including militia and: 
Interior forces 10 000 
Formation "Guard" 14 000 
Committee for the Implementation
of Punishment 
7 000 
State Auto Inspection 2 500 
 
The reforming of the Ministry of the Interior in 2002 envisaged reductions of 
personnel in the central bodies, strengthening of the directorates of morals, illegal 
drug trafficking and the criminal militia. Technical services will be gradually manned 
with civilians. The State Auto Inspection is undergoing reductions, and sergeants are 
replaced with officers.5 
 
In the Fall of 2002 the Ministry of the Interior has been subjected to a comprehensive 
inspection of its activities directed by the Security Council. Any public organizations 
or independent inspectors have not been involved. 
 
c) Forces of the Ministry for Emergency Situations 
 
d) Special Services: 
 
State Security Committe of the Republic of Belarus 
Presidential Security Service 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
4 Belorusskii Rynok. March 4-10, 2002, p.1. 
5 Ibid. 
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3 Elaboration, Adoption and Implementation of Conceptual Documents 
Dealing with National Security6 
 
Table 4. THE CURRENT LEGISLATION ON BELARUS' ARMED FORCES: (selected 
documents) 
 
• The National Security Concept 
Adopted by the Presidential decree of July 17, 2001  N 390 - [p30000390] 
 
• Presidential executive order approving the Plan of Measures on the 
Implementation of the National Security Concept - August 14, 2002 
 
• The Law "On the Adoption of the Military Doctrine of the Republic of Belarus"
Signed by President on January 3, 2002  N 4-З - [h10200074]
Adopted by the House of Representatives on December 12, 2001
Approved by the Council of the Republic on December 20, 2001 
 
• The Law "On  Defense" 
Adopted on November 3, 1992 
Amended on July 17, 2002 
 
• The Concept of Territorial Defense 
Approved by a presidential Decree in November 2001 (incorporated in the Law on 
Defense) 
 
• The Law "On the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus" 
Adopted on November 11, 1992 
Amendments: 
September 4, 1996 
November 9, 1999 
July 24, 2002 
 
• The Law "On the Martial Law" 
Adopted in the first reading  by the House of Representatives on October 3, 2002 
 
                                                 
6 For the analysis of the earlier situation see: Vyachaslau Paznyak, "Problemy 
Demokraticheskogo Kontrolya nad Voennoj Sferoi v Respublike Belarus" (Problems of the 
Democratic Control over the Military Sphere in the Republic of Belarus). In: Demokraticheskii 
Kontrol' nad Voennoi Sferoi v Rossii i Stranakh SNG (Democratic Control over the Military 
Sphere in Russia and the CIS). Ed. by A. Nikitin. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of 
the Armed Forces and Centre for Political and International Studies (Moscow) – Moscow: 
Eslan Publishers, 2002 and Vyachaslau Paznyak, "Struktura i Praktika Parlamentskogo 
Kontrolya za Politikoi i Deyatel'nost'u Ispolnitelnoi Vlasti v Voennoi Sfere" (The Structure and 
Procedures of Parliamentary Control over the Policies and Practices of the Executive in the 
Military Sphere: the Case of Belarus). In: Parlamentskii Kontrol' nad Voennoi Sferoi v Novykh 
Nezavisimykh Gosudarstvakh. Analiticheskiye Doklady ( ary Control over the Military Sphere 
in the New Independent States. Analytical Papers). Ed. by A. Nikitin .-  Moscow: Centre for 
Political and International Studies, 1998. 
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• The Law "On Mobilization Preparations and Mobilization" 
Adopted on October 26, 2000  N 449-З - [h10000449] 
Amendments: 
May 16, 2001 N 23-З  
Adopted by the House of Representatives on October 2, 2000  
Approved by the Council of the Republic on October 12, 2000 
 
• The Law "On General Conscription and Military Service" 
Adopted on November 5,1992. N 1914-XII - [v19201914] 
Amendments: 
April 13, 1995  N 3735-XII  
May12,1999  N 260-З  
December 31, 1999  N 351-З 
May 15, 2000  N 385-З  
 
• The Law "On the Status of Servicemen" 
Adopted on November 13, 1992 N1939-XII - [v19201939] 
Amendements: 
March 25, 1993 N 2262-XII  
February 22, 1995  N 3610-XII 
March 22, 1995  N 3685-XII  
Suspended by the Presidential Decree of September 1, 1995  N 349  
January 6, 1998  N 124-З 
December 31, 1999  N 351-З 
 
• The Criminal Code of the Republic of Belarus 
Adopted on July 9, 1999 N 275-З - [hk9900275] 
Adopted by the House of Representatives on June 2, 1999  
Approved by the Council of the Republic on June 24, 1999 
 
• The Criminal-Executive Code of the Republic of Belarus 
Adopted on January 11, 2000  N 365-З - [hk0000365] 
Adopted by the House of Representatives on December 14, 1999  
Approved by the Council of the Republic on December 22, 1999  
 
On August 14, 2002 President Lukashenko issued an executive order approving the 
Plan of Measures on the Implementation of the National Security Concept. In the 
political field, the plan envisages measures on finalizing the succession of the 
Republic of Belarus regarding the treaties of the former USSR with the European 
states on mutual legal assistance in civil and criminal cases. With a view to enhance 
protection of the rights and interests of the Belarusian citizens the work on the 
country's accession to the basic treaties in the criminal-law field, concluded within the 
framework of the UN and the Council of Europe, is to be continued.  
Considerable attention in the document is given to ensuring security in the economic 
field. 
 
Enhancing environmental security and protection of natural resources are the issues 
placed under special control with the country's leadership. In this context, by 2005 it 
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is planned to draft the Concept and the Plan of Action on the creation of the national 
ecological network, the State Programme on ensuring the radiation protection and 
limiting the medical exposure of the public. Annual ecological propaganda 
arrangements are also envisaged. An information analytical centre for monitoring 
emergency situations is to be founded within the State system of prevention and 
elimination of emergency situations, and an automated management system 
"Expertise" is to be set up with the data bank on the state of environment, natural 
resources and anthropogenic impact on individual regions of the republic. The 
ministries of industry, of natural resources and environment protection, of foreign 
affairs, the National Academy of Sciences are to be involved in drafting and 
improving the legislative acts on implementation of Belarus' commitments under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  
Draft programmes will be elaborated to protect intellectual property in the Republic of 
Belarus, to create a universally accessible Internet portal of official information on the 
activity of the state, to develop TV and radio industry are aimed at ensuring the 
information-security.7 
 
What provisions pertaining to civil control of the armed forces are contained in the 
new national security concept and the revised military laws? 
 
Article 4 of the National Security Concept qualifies civil control over the armed forces 
as one of the vital state interests in the military sphere. This provision, however, is 
not elaborated any further. Article 8.3 lists among the main functions of the system of 
ensuring national security “control over the activities of state organs, organizations, 
including public associations, as well as citizens, involved in the sphere of national 
security, and informing citizens on issues of ensuring national security.” 
 
Article 8.3 of the Military Doctrine lists among the principles of ensuring military 
security “a combination of a centralized management of the stat4e’s military 
organization and civil control over its activities.” 
 
Article 6 of the Law on the Armed Forces lists among the principles of building and of 
the activities of the armed forces glasnost and openness for civilian control, that 
                                                 
7 Press Service of the President of the Republic of Belarus 
http://www.president.gov.by/eng/president/press/p08_2.shtml 
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ensure participation of all citizens of Belarus in boosting the country’s defense 
capabilities. According to Article 17 of the Law control over the armed forces is 
executed by the President, the Council of Ministers, as well as other state organs 
within the limits of their competence. This new version of the Law does not mention 
Parliament, which was in place in the previous draft text. 
 
Compared to the draft military laws of 1997 where the need to implement the 
principle of democratic control over the armed forces was stressed and a special 
provision on parliamentary control was incorporated, the revised package of military 
laws features a radical consolidation of controlling functions with the President. 
 
This departure from the principles of civil control is even more stark if we refer to the 
military laws adopted in Belarus in the early 90’s.  
 
In August 2002 the Draft Law on Civil Control and Management of the Military 
Organization was sent to the MOD, National Security Council and the House of 
representatives of the National Assembly - the lower chamber of Belarusian 
Parliament. The Draft was prepared by a little-known Belarusian NGO called 
“Citizens for National Security.” Generally, the bill repeated the structure and 
contents of the corresponding Russian draft law, but surpassed the latter in the 
scope and radicalism. In a nutshell, it turned out to be ultrarevolutionary for today’s 
Belarus and implied changing of the Constitution itself. The reaction of the authorities 
was unanimous, and even without any formal examination at the Parliament the draft 
law was declared unnecessary and premature.8 
  
Table 5. Norms of civil control, envisaged by the draft 
Law on Civil Control and Management of Military Organization and Activity 
 
Expanding the Parliament's rights 
Appointing a civil servant as Defense Minister who, in turn, appoints civil inspectors to 
inspect any activity within the Armed Forces. 
Forming parliamentary commissions empowered to investigate violations of civil rights and 
liberties in the armed forces. 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Vrazhkin, Yu. "Zakonoproekt  iz buduschego napravlen v nikuda" (The Bill 
from the Future is Leading Nowhere). – Vo Slavu Rodiny, August 30, 2002; Nezvanov A. 
"Civil Control Over Army Good But Premature." The Belarus Today, August 6-12, 2002, p.4; 
Seroshtan, V. "Armija Budet Professional'noi, no ne Najomnoi" (The Amy will be Proffessional 
but not Mercenary). 7 Dnej, September 14, 2002, p.3; 
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Conducting parliamentary hearings on military construction. 
Establishing special commissions for introducing changes in the military legislation. 
Empowering deputy investigation of activities carried out by state bodies including security 
structures. 
Appointing a plenipotentiary out of deputies of the House of Representatives for a term of 
four years to ensure observance of the constitutional rights and liberties in the army as well 
as of carrying military service in accordance with Belarus' legislation, to analyze complaints 
and prepare problem-solving recommendations, to maintain relations with public 
organizations and the mass media, informing them, if necessary, on its activities. 
Empowering the plenipotentiary to request and receive any documents and materials 
necessary for considering claim from any officer of the Armed Forces and military bodies or 
directly from military units. The plenipotentiary enjoys the right to be received without delay 
by officers of the Armed Forces, military bodies and formations, enjoys the right to visit 
freely and without prior notification military units, as well as attend meetings of the 
commanding bodies and take measures to protect military personnel in accordance with the 
effective legislation.  
Expanding the rights of the executive bodies 
Authorizing the Committee of State Control to exercise control over just and rational 
spending of budget funds allotted for ensuring national security and carrying out military 
activity. 
Expanding the rights of non-state actors and civil society 
Granting political parties and public associations the right to request and freely receive any 
information, documents or materials not bearing state or military secret from military 
command and other bodies, enterprises, establishments and organizations carrying military 
activities. 
 
 
3.1 (D)evolution of the Role of the National Assembly (Parliament)  
 
On October 9, 2002, on the eve of examining the bill "On the National Assembly of 
the Republic of Belarus," in the second reading at the House of Representatives, 
President Lukashenko warned against any encroachments of branches of power on 
each other and against intrusion by them into each other's field of action. As to the 
issue of enlarging the powers of the parliament, the Belarusian leader reminded that 
"we have a strong presidential republic, where President is the Head of the State 
invested with wide powers in accordance with the Constitution... The Parliament must 
not and cannot tackle the issue of balancing the presidential powers because it runs 
contrary to the Constitution.9 
 
                                                 
9 Press Service of the President of the Republic of Belarus 
http://www.president.gov.by/eng/president/press/10.shtml 
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4 The Role of National Non-Governmental Institutions Specializing in 
Studying Security Problems and Preparing Recommendations in this 
Field 
 
Parties and Civil Society Structures: an overview 
 
Table 6. Political Parties in Belarus 
 
As of February 18, 2002 the following 18 political parties are registered and function:  
 
two Communist parties the Liberal-Democratic Party 
three Social Democratic parties the Women's Party 
two Ecological parties the United Civic Party 
two parties of Labour and Justice the Patriotic Party 
one party of social and sports orientation the Agrarian Party 
two parties of the Belarusian Popular Front the Republican Party.  
 
There are 39 nation-wide trade unions and 19 trade unions of the enterprises.  
 
There are 2025 of NGO's in Belarus, including: 
international - 178; 
republican - 741; 
regional - 114; 
district (municipal) - 929;  
other local - 63. 
 
There have been created and are now functioning 14 unions of NGO's. 
 
Table  7. NGO's areas of activity 
 
31 women's public amalgamations 29 - children's 
100 - youth activities 56 – veteran 
78 - social support of handicapped people 76 - national minorities amalgamations 
114 – professional 19 - military-patriotic 
31 - creative unions 154 - cultural and educational 
396 – sports 281- charity 
41 - defence of human rights and freedoms 53 - health care 
40 - friendship and international cooperation 100 - amateurs' associations 
105 - science and technology 44 – ecological 
39 – Chernobyl 6 – agricultural 
232 NGO's are oriented to other areas  
  8
  
 
The official statistics makes it a point, that political parties, trade unions and NGO's 
use symbols on a wide scale. Overall, 975 symbols t have been registered. They 
include: 831 emblems, 77 flags, 29 pennons, 26 badges, 9 anthems, and 3 ties.10  
 
The following few Belarusian NGO's have been dealing with security issues: 
1. The National Center for Strategic Initiatives "East-West" (established in 1993) - 
later renamed Analytical Center "Strategy" has managed to maintain close 
contacts with governmental economic experts and to side with the opposition on 
political issues 
2. The Development and Security Research Institute (DSRI) (established in 1994) 
has closely cooperated with the Belarusian government in its activities. 
3. The International Institute for Policy Studies  (IIPS) (established in 1995). The 
IIPS organized several international seminars together with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs on conversion and export controls and has maintained working 
contacts with the MFA and the DOD. 
4. Support Center for Associations and Foundations (SCAF) 
(established in 1996). SCAF has conducted landmine monitor research in 
Belarus and apparently maintains working contacts with Belarusian governmental 
agencies. 
5. Citizens for National Security (CNS) (established in 1998) 
 
The first three centers have been more active in organizing seminars and 
conferences with the participation of experts from the government. Also, they have 
published conference materials and journals. 
 
Besides, some new centers have been established: 
? Center for International Studies of the Belarusian State University 
(established in 2000) 
? Center for European and Transatlantic Studies of the European Humanities 
University – a non-state university - (established in 2000) 
 
                                                 
10 Official Site of the President of the Republic of Belarus -  
http://www.president.gov.by/eng/president/comment/ngo.shtml 
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With the support of the Foreign Ministry the former has organized a number of 
seminars and conferences on Belarus foreign policy, including security aspects, while 
the latter has not been visible so far. 
 
Independent sociological research centers "NOVAK" and the Independent Institute of 
Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS) have regularly included security-
related issues in their monitoring of the public opinion in Belarus. 
 
Generally, due to the political situation in Belarus, interaction of the state with political 
parties and NGO’s has fitted two patterns: 
1. ignoring, attempting to put under control, applying sanctions, closing, imprisoning 
activists; 
2. the second pattern refers basically to experts and analysts who may sit next to 
each other at conferences and seminars in Belarus and abroad. This experience 
is, however, mixed. State bodies are cautious to invite independent analysts to 
join their activities. NGO’s, on the other hand, are much more open.  
 
So far, there is a lack of mutual trust, and no common ground for a productive 
cooperation has been created. State experts are generally sceptical about the 
independent expertise and deplore what they judge as an irreconcilable negativism 
towards the official policies. This seriously undermines prospects for the shaping of 
an expert community bringing together a wide spectrum of alternatives.  
 
Overall, under the current conditions cooperation among governmental and non-
governmental organizations on the institutional level is limited and often problematic. 
One thing is certain, though. It is the fact, that state agencies are not completely deaf 
to independent analysis and are monitoring the newly available materials.  
 
The Mass Media and the Control of Security Structures 
 
1212 periodicals (newspapers - 778, magazines - 379, bulletins - 54, catalogue -1) 
and five information agencies are registered in Belarus as of February 1, 2002. 2/3 
out of the total number are non-state owned periodicals. 170 TV and radio 
broadcasting programmes are registered at present (120 - broadcasting, 50 
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telecasting), 114 of them being state-owned, while 56 - non-state owned.  
 
Table 8. Registered printed-word media 
as of  January 1,  2002 
1223 registered media include: 
state-owned 373 
non-state owned 850 
Political 287 
periodicals of political parties 4 
periodicals of NGO’s 112 
periodicals of religious organizations 29 
owned by private persons 361 
 
 
All the Belarusian periodicals are printed in this country. Non-state owned 
publications can conclude a contract for being printed by the state printing-houses. At 
present the state supports nearly forty periodicals by granting subsidies from the 
budget for their issue. Five public and political newspapers are self-supporting.11 
 
The situation with the mass media with regard to security structures is complicated. 
First of all, the mass media are politically engaged and are consequently divided, the 
lion’ share belonging to the state. So, in the case of Belarus the mass media is not 
the “fourth power,” but, rather, an additional instrument in the government’s toolbox. 
 
Only the governmental mass media have specialized publications and radio and TV 
programs dealing with security issues. For instance, various aspects of the activities 
of the armed forces are covered in a journal “The Army,” a newspaper “Vo Slavu 
Rodiny” (for the glory of Motherland), a TV program “Arsenal,” and some others. 
State-owned mass media tend to be mild or positive in their reporting and are often 
superficial. 
 
The real function of public control over the security sector is performed - 
understandably, to a limited extent - by non-state newspapers. Unfortunately, their 
number and circulation are growing smaller for many, mainly political, reasons. While 
they are trying to “open up” the state, the state is closing them down. The remaining 
nation-wide non-state newspapers covering security issues are “Narodnaya Volya,” 
                                                 
11 Official Site of the President of the Republic of Belarus - 
http://www.president.gov.by/eng/president/comment/smi.shtml 
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“Svobodnyje Novosti-Plus,” “The Belarus Today,” "Belorusskii Rynok,” “Belorusskaja 
Delovaja Gazeta,” and “Belorusskaja Gazeta.” Their peculiarity is that they publish 
predominantly reports and short critical articles, but seldom offer analysis and 
political recommenations. 
 
Journalists, specializing in security matters are very few both in state and non-state 
mass media. 
 
As for NGO’s, they publish only two journals dealing with security: “the Vector” of the 
International Institute for Policy Studies and “Belarus in the World” of the Research 
and Development Institute of Belarus. Other NGO’s publish such materials randomly. 
 
6 Influence of International Environment on National Security Structures 
 
The influence of international environment on Belarusian security structures is 
manyfold. With regard to such key prerequisite of democratic control as 
transparency,  of great importance is the country's participation in international arms 
control agreements. Belarus is bound by international legal acts on information 
exchange, in particular, by the  decisions of the OSCE Forum for Security 
Cooperation No.13/97 and No. 8/98 (on arms and equipment export/import), No. 4/98 
(answers to questions on the Code of Conduct relating to military and political 
aspects of security), No. 20/95 (on policy in the sphere of arms and equipment 
export), No. 5/96 (on ratification of Chemical Convention), No.14/97 (answers to 
questions relating to anti-personnel mines and UN General Assembly Resolution 
No.46/36 L (on arms and equipment export/import) and No. 40/91 L (on military 
budget).Belarus signed the Open Sky Treaty, the Lisbon Protocol to START I the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction (Chemical Convention), the Protocol on 
the Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices 
with Amendments to Convention On "Non-Humane" Conventional Arms (Mines 
Protocol), The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTB Treaty), the Agreement On the 
Adaptation of the CFE Treaty, as well as assumed the corresponding obligations 
under the 1992, 1994 and 1996 Vienna Documents of negotiations on confidence 
and security-building measures (Vienna Document), Global Information Exchange of 
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28 November 1994, the OSCE Document On Small Arms and Light Weapons of 24 
November 2000 (LSA Document). 
 
Belarus participates in an exchange of information and notification via diplomatic 
channels and specially developed round-the-clock communication. It provides 
information within the framework of the CFE Treaty, the Vienna Document and the 
Global Exchange of Military Information. 
 
The influence of the international environment on Belarus’ security structures is 
contradictory. 
• Firstly, it is perceived as hostile and dangerous 
• Secondly, it pushes towards cooperation on such issues as international 
terrorism, organized crime, illegal migration and some others. After 9/11 bilateral 
and regional interaction on new security threats has been intensified. 
• Thirdly, the threat of terrorism leads to misconceptions that strengthening the 
armed forces is a logical and necessary countermeasure. 
 
The overall inadequate level of cooperation of Belarus with the West and with 
Western and even wider key international organizations, such as the OSCE, because 
of Belarus’ domestic political situation, negatively tells on the adequacy of awareness 
and perceptions of Belarusian security structures about the international security 
environment, which leads to their greater parochialism and limits options for 
transformations in the security sector.  
 
Conclusions: 
 
1. The current stage of the development of Belarus' political system is not conducive 
to the shaping of a system of democratic control over the security sector. The 
main thrust of contending political forces over the last several years has been to 
ensure control over the state at large rather than democratic control over the 
armed forces. This struggle resulted in a considerable consolidation of state 
powers at the expense of civil society. 
2. The military reform, which is underway in Belarus, leaves out the issue of 
introducing democratic control. 
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3. It is an obvious fact that compared to the situation of the early 90’s and even to 
the period of 1997-99, there is a regression in the process of shaping democratic 
control mechanisms over security sector in Belarus. 
 
4. Expectations that in the context of the bilateral integration under the influence of 
Russia the political system of Belarus would become more open and the military 
cooperation would bring to the fore issues of democratic control have not come 
true. Commenting on the issue, Mr. Vladimir Turdenev, Director of the Second 
CIS Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed a previous 
statement by Defense Minister Serguei Ivanov to the effect that Russia and 
Belarus will be reforming their force structure in a synchronized manner. He 
added, however, that parliamentary control over this process would be carried out 
in accordance with each country's legislation.12 
 
Some developments in 2001-2002 have demonstrated serious problems along the 
way to the shaping of a viable model of civil-military relations in Belarus under the 
exiting political conditions. 
 
On the one hand, an attempt by the Belarusian legislature to make a step forward to 
setting a precedent for a public debate over the draft law on information security 
failed and was discouraged both due to the draft’s substantive drawbacks and also 
because of a severe criticism from political opposition forces. 
 
On the other hand, the text of the draft law on civil-military relations offered by a 
Belarusian NGO encountered a bitter and unanimous rebuff from the government, 
revealing both the lack of experience of NGO experts and the System’s recalcitrance 
to cooperate with non-governmental structures and the lack of trust in outsiders. The 
latter may have a lasting negative effect for further legislative initiatives on 
democratic control over the security sector. 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 An unofficial comment given to a Belarusian journalist. 
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To sum up, the following issues related to democratic control over the security 
sphere in Belarus remain topical: 
• acknowledging and formalizing by law the provision that democratic control over 
the security sphere is an integral part of ensuring security of the individual, 
society, and the state; 
• achieving greater transparency of the decisions and activities of state structures 
in the security sphere, starting with budgetory allocations; 
• incorporating the problematique of democratic control in the guidelines of military 
reform; 
• establishing a constructive dialogue among governmental and international non-
governmental experts in civil-military relations, shaping the Belarusian 
component of the international strategic community; 
• developing adequate perceptions of today's security issues through open 
discussions, publications, seminars, means of information and education; 
• finally, consistently applying the principles of the democratic development to 
Belarus’ political system and acknowledging in practice the interdependence of 
the level of public security on the one hand, and the democratic standards of 
state and public institutions. 
 
The case of Belarus poses a number of crucial questions with regard to civil-military 
relations: 
? can the security sphere be democratized without the democratization of the 
political system?  
? should the political system be democratized first as a prerequisite for a success 
with the security sector?  
? can the introduction of democratic control become the starting point for 
democratization of the political system?  
 
Answers to these questions are not as obvious as they might seem to be. 
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Established in 2000 on the initiative of the Swiss government, the Geneva 
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), encourages and 
supports States and non-State governed institutions in their efforts to strengthen 
democratic and civilian control of armed and security forces, and promotes 
international cooperation within this field, initially targeting Euro-Atlantic regions.  
The Centre collects information, undertakes research and engages in 
networking activities in order to identify problems, to establish lessons learned 
and to propose the best practices in the field of democratic control of armed 
forces and civil-military relations. The Centre provides its expertise and support 
to all interested parties, in particular governments, parliaments, military 
authorities, international organisations, non-governmental organisations, 
academic circles. 
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